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ABSTRACT:  Recent literature has emphasized that individuals display different depths of 
reasoning when playing games. In this paper, we explore gender differences in strategic 
sophistication and study whether these differences are endogenous. We report results from 
two different experiments employing the beauty contest. In the first, large study, we show 
that females react very strongly to incentives to the extent that gender differences disappear 
when a monetary prize is awarded. In the second study, we use a within subject design to 
analyze how depth of reasoning varies with gender priming and the gender composition of 
the set of players. We corroborate that females display higher levels of sophistication and 
even overtake males when incentives are provided and gender is primed. On the other hand, 
males who believe that females are better in the game display higher sophistication when 
playing against females.   
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1 Introduction
The experimental literature provides substantial evidence of the existence of
strong individual heterogeneity in strategic sophistication or depth of reason-
ing. Observed individual behavior departs drastically from the predictions
derived under the assumption of commonly-known unbounded cognitive ca-
pabilities (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Ho, Camerer and Weigelt,
1998; Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta, 2001; Bosch-Domenech, Mon-
talvo, Nagel and Satorra, 2002). This seems to reect di¤erences in the
extent in which individuals engage in mentalizing processes or "theory of
mind", that is, the activity of thinking about others thoughts, emotions
and intentions (Baron-Cohen, 1991). Models of k-level thinking have been
proposed in order to account for these experimental results. These models
acknowledge that individuals have di¤erent cognitive levels and have non-
equilibrium beliefs about the sophistication of others.1
But strategic sophistication is a complex concept to pin down. It is surely
endogenous. The depth of reasoning displayed by an individual might de-
pend on her innate mentalizing or cognitive abilities, but also on her beliefs
about the sophistication of others, and on the incentives provided. An indi-
vidual may be sophisticated enough to provide the response corresponding
to the standard game theoretical prediction but that response may fail to
acknowledge that the rest of the population might be incapable of that. It
would be questionable to label such response as more sophisticated than
a response which departs from the game theoretical prediction but which
takes correctly into account the heterogeneity in strategic sophistication in
the population. On the other hand, a person may be reluctant to engage
in further levels of reasoning, which require extra mental e¤ort, unless the
potential rewards of doing so are high enough. Responses in low stakes
settings might not then reect the mentalizing abilities of individuals, but
rather their lack of motivation to engage in the process. In short, it should
be natural to expect observed strategic sophistication to depend on both
beliefs about the sophistication of others and on incentives.2
1Level-k models of thinking were introduced by Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson
(1994, 1995). Later Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) proposed the cognitive hierarchy
model. Both models are anchored on the existence of non-strategic individuals, labelled
Level-0 or L0, but then di¤er on how individuals respond to the presence of less sophisti-
cated ones. Level-k models have been applied to a number of strategic interactions such
as communication and auctions. For a thorough survey, we refer the reader to Crawford,
Costa-Gomes and Iriberri (2013).
2See Choi (2012) and Alaoui and Penta (2013) for recent attempts to develop theoretical
models capable of accounting for the endogeneity of strategic sophistication.
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In this paper, we explore the heterogeneity and endogeneity of strategic
sophistication in the context of gender. Gender constitutes an obvious source
of observable heterogeneity across individuals. Hence, gender can bring up
relevant questions in the analysis of strategic sophistication. Our main goals
are to study whether gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication exist and,
more importantly, to disentangle the potential source of such di¤erences.
Regarding individual heterogeneity, our rst question is whether there
exist gender di¤erences in depth of strategic reasoning.3 To the best of our
knowledge, no previous study has attempted to study gender di¤erences in
mentalizing ability, beliefs and sensitivity to incentives in games. This ques-
tion has additional importance if stereotype threat is relevant in strategic
interactions. The stereotype threat literature argues that observed gender
di¤erences in performance are due not to objective di¤erences in ability but
to stereotypes that a¤ect negatively the cognitive ability of the threatened
group when triggered (Steele, 1997).
A related question is whether males and females di¤er in their beliefs
about the sophistication of others. In the context of gender, these beliefs
might be based on stereotypes. Gender stereotypes a¤ect daily behavior
in a pervasive manner and hence they might have an impact on strategic
behavior. Gender priming can be used to make beliefs and stereotypes about
the relative sophistication of males and females salient. If gender di¤erences
in beliefs exist, alterations in the gender composition of the group of players
should modify observed strategic sophistication.
Also related to the endogeneity of depth of reasoning, our last question is
whether males and females respond di¤erently to the presence of monetary
incentives. Higher stakes might frame the interaction in a di¤erent light and
hence induce changes in strategic behavior as well.
We explore these questions in the p-beauty contest/guessing game (Nagel,
1995). The guessing game is well suited for our purposes for a number of
reasons. First, it is a competitive game. Players must anticipate the average
response of others in order to win. Only the winner obtains the prize. Incen-
tives are easy to adjust by changing its monetary value. In addition, beliefs
about the sophistication of others are extremely important, as highlighted
by the models of k-level thinking. Finally, the game involves a relatively
complex calculation task: subjects must think what might be the average
response, including their own, and then multiply the result by the announced
3This is denitely a thorny issue, more so since the Summers a¤air in 2005. We
believe that our understanding of strategic sophistication is better served by tackling such
question rather than by ignoring altogether.
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factor one or more times. This calculation may trigger stereotypes related
to the mathematical abilities of females and make them appear as less so-
phisticated (Spencer, Steele and Quinn, 1999; Quinn and Spencer, 2001).4
Krendl, Richeson, Kelley and Heatherton (2008) use fMRI to show that brain
areas involved in calculation are less active in females when this stereotype
is activated. These brain areas the angular gyrus and the inferior parietal
lobuleare also relevant for subjects playing the beauty-contest (Coricelli
and Nagel, 2009).
We present the results of two studies. Study 1 is a large between-subject
classroom experiment. Students in six di¤erent cohorts played the 2/3 guess-
ing game. In half of these cohorts, no monetary prize was given to the win-
ner(s), whereas a monetary prize was awarded in the other three. We nd
substantial gender di¤erences in the "No-prize" treatment. Female subjects
display a less sophisticated behavior than males. However, no gender di¤er-
ences exist in the Prize treatment because there is a signicant shift down
in females responses across treatments. Males behaved similarly under the
two treatments.
The second study is a within-subject experiment designed to ascertain
the role of beliefs and gender stereotypes in strategic thinking. It allows
us to track down individual behavior when economic incentives and gender
composition change. The experimental sessions of this study had two phases.
During the rst phase, subjects played several rounds of the p-beauty con-
test. There were neither gender priming nor monetary incentives in this
phase as in the "No prize" treatment of Study 1. In the second phase, there
was a monetary prize at stake. We also manipulated the gender composi-
tion of the groups. Subjects competed in same gender and mixed gender
groups (with balanced composition). We primed gender by simultaneously
moving groups of same gender subjects from one room to another and by
changing the color of the instructions booklet (from white to pink or blue).
The purpose of this intervention was to make gender salient. This design
also allows us to explore the existence of stereotype threat in the game.
Results from Study 2 suggest that strategic sophistication is quite sen-
sitive to beliefs and incentives. Firstly, females react strongly to incentives
and priming. We corroborate the result in Study 1 showing that females
display lower strategic sophistication than males when incentives are ab-
sent. However, gender di¤erences did not disappear as in Study 1 when
4The existence of gender di¤erences in math performance is still a much debated is-
sue. The evidence shows that although there are no gender di¤erence in performance in
arithmetic or algebra, there exist small-to-medium di¤erences in high-school and top-end
performers (Lindberg, Hyde, Petersen and Linn, 2010; Fryer and Levitt, 2010).
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we awarded a monetary prize and primed gender. The direction of these
di¤erences actually reversed. Females displayed higher strategic sophistica-
tion than males. Moreover, we found that low sophisticated subjects were
responsible for these gender di¤erences. Secondly, when comparing rounds
in which gender composition changed, we observe that only males modify
their responses. Males with intermediate levels of sophistication lower their
answers in mixed gender groups. We thus nd no evidence of stereotype
threat a¤ecting females.
We explore the reasons behind the changes in behavior due to gender
composition by analyzing the responses to a questionnaire administered at
the end of the session. Females who thought that females respond higher
numbers changed their behavior depending on the gender composition of
the group whereas the rest of females did not. Responses to these questions
also suggest that males thought more deeply about the game when playing
in mixed gender groups because they believed females to be better in the
game and to perform well in it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next two sections
describe the design and results in each of the two studies we report in this
paper. Section 5 describes the result of the questionnaire we administered
at the end of Study 2. In Section 6, we perform additional analysis under
alternative measures of strategic sophistication. We conclude and discuss
our results further in Section 7.
2 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge, no study has attempted to study the exis-
tence of gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication. The reason behind
this might be a genuine lack of di¤erences, but also a conscious choice of
researchers due either to ideological reasons or to the potential controversy
of the topic. Very few experimental studies report evidence of gender di¤er-
ences as a by-product of their design either. Camerer et al. (2004) report in
their Table 2 results for a beauty contest in same gender groups, but they
only show summary statistics. As a by-product of a twin study, Burnham,
Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein and Wallace (2009) nd no gender dif-
ferences in choices in the beauty contest. This is consistent with the results
we obtain when gender is not primed and monetary incentives are given.
Östling, Wang, Chou, and Camerer (2011) and Arad and Rubinstein (2012)
report that females display slightly lower strategic sophistication in the Low-
est Unique Positive Integer (LUPI) game and in the Colonel Blotto games
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respectively. Let us reiterate that the main goal of these studies was not to
investigate the existence of gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication.
Several studies have explored the existence of other types of individ-
ual di¤erences in the beauty contest. Although some di¤erences emerge 
portfolio managers and game theorists display higher strategic sophistication
the overall picture is that behavior in the beauty contest is very similar across
subject pools (Bosch-Domenech, et al., 2002; Camerer et al, 2004). For in-
stance, Kovalchik, Camerer, Gretherb, Plott and Allman (2005) nd that
older adults play similarly to young adults and Bühren and Bjorn (2010)
nd that chess grandmasters do not play di¤erently than lay people.
A number of studies have found that depth of strategic reasoning re-
sponds strongly to the perceived sophistication of opponents. Palacios-
Huerta and Volij (2009) nd that when students play the centipede game
against professional chess players they engage in more rounds of backward
induction.5 Similarly, Georganas, Healy and Weber (2010) nd that some
players increase their level of reasoning against stronger opponents but that
previous play cannot predict which subjects make this adjustment. Alaoui
and Penta (2013) nd that subjects display less depth of reasoning when
playing against opponents perceived to be less sophisticated than them.
Agranov, Potamites, Schotter and Tergiman (2012) obtain a similar result
in the beauty contest: undergraduate students display higher strategic so-
phistication when playing against graduate students than against computers.
We are aware of only one experimental study relating strategic sophisti-
cation to incentives. Alaoui and Penta (2013) nd that subjects do engage
in more rounds of reasoning when the prize from outguessing the opponent
increases.6 However, these authors do not explore the presence of gender
di¤erences in the response to higher stakes. Fryer, Levitt and List (2008)
nd that the performance of males in a GRE-style mathematical test in-
creases relative to the performance of females when a payment per correct
answer is introduced. This is the opposite result to the one we nd in our
two studies, but this might be due to the strategic nature of our experiment.
In contrast, Frick (2011) employs data from professional distance running
competitions and nds, in line with our results, that di¤erences in the com-
petitiveness between female and male races are signicantly smaller in races
where higher prizes or more prestige are at stake.
5This is not contemplated by models of k-level thinking since agents in these models
do not factor the presence of individuals more sophisticated than them.
6Arad and Rubinstein (2012) run a treatment where they manipulate payo¤s so that
further levels of reasoning have no monetary cost. They nd that nevertheless subjects
very rarely perform more than three rounds of reasoning.
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By using a competitive game, in which the player who best guesses the
average response wins, our paper also relates to the literature in Economics
which studies gender di¤erences in competitive performance. Gneezy, Niederle
and Rustichini (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) have shown that
females underperform in competitive environments. In the former paper,
subjects had to solve mazes under di¤erent compensation schemes. Women
performed worse under the tournament scheme. On the other hand, Gneezy
and Rustichini (2004) nd that Israeli boys but not girls run faster against
another child than when they run alone. Dreber, von Essen and Ranehill
(2011) fail to replicate this result for a sample of Swedish kids. This sug-
gests that gender di¤erences in competitiveness might be cultural. Günther,
Ekinci, Schwieren, and Strobel (2010) nd that competitive performance de-
pends on the perceived bias of the task; females perform better than males
when the task is perceived as female-biased. Along similar lines, Shurchkov
(2012) nd that females overtake men in competitions involving a verbal
task and low-time pressure. Regarding the e¤ect of gender priming, Iriberri
and Rey-Biel (2013) show that omitting information about the gender of the
opponent helps to mitigate the underperformance of women in competition.
In contrast, we nd that gender priming induces females to display higher
strategic sophistication and to overtake males.
3 Study 1: Beauty in the classroom
The subjects of this study consisted of six cohorts of undergraduate stu-
dents taking an Intermediate Microeconomics course at the University of
Edinburgh between 2005 and 2010. As part of the course, students had to
ll an online problem set containing several game-theoretic questions imple-
mented via the website Games and Behavior developed by Ariel Rubinstein
and Eli Zvuluny7. The classes were big, ranging between 116 and 170 stu-
dents. Completing the problem set was compulsory and liable to a small
mark penalty. Response rates were very high, a 91.83% on average. All
students had received no instruction in game theory before answering the
questions. The problem set was actually designed as a didactic method to
introduce the basic concepts of game theory. In total, 792 students took
part; 480 of them were male and 312 were female.8
7Available at http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/.
8When retrieving the data from the website, we were provided rst with the list of
participantsnames but without their responses in order to ensure anonimity. We then
assigned gender to these names and returned the list. We then received the data associ-
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Figure 1:Histogram of responses in Study 1 (n=792).
The specic question we are interested in was a beauty contest. Stu-
dents had to guess 2/3 of the average of all responses of students in the
class.9 Figure 1 contains the histogram of responses for the entire sample of
792 students. The graph shows the typical pattern of responses in beauty
contests (Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002): Just above 3% or participants re-
sponded zero, the Nash equilibrium prediction. The spikes of frequency at
50, 33 and 22, according to the theory of k-level thinking, correspond to
individuals with sophistication of level 0, 1 and 2 respectively.
However, this graph masks important heterogeneity. We ran two di¤er-
ent treatments with three cohorts each: In the 2007, 2008 and 2010 cohorts
(n=480), a prize of £ 10 (about 12 euros) was given to the student(s) who
made the best guess. If there were more than one winner, the prize was
divided among them. We call this the Prize treatment. The No prize treat-
ment corresponds to the other three cohorts (n=312) in which no money
was awarded to the winner. The instructor did not mention in class that
the name of the winner(s) was to be announced publicly. So for the No prize
treatment, such non-monetary reward was not made explicit.10
ating responses to the gender of the responder.
9The exact phrasing was: "Each of you (the students in this course) have to choose an
integer between 0 and 100 in order to guess 2/3 of the average of the responses given by
all students in the course. Each student who guesses 2/3 of the average of all responses
rounded up to the nearest integer, will receive a prize to be announced by your teacher
(or alternatively will have the satisfaction of being right!)."
10This does not rule out that students could seek prestige or status among their closer
peers by winning.
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Table 1 shows the aggregate results for the two treatments in Study 1
and compares them with the aggregate results of other experiments on the
beauty contest. The studies in italics correspond to subject pools composed
by non-students.11 The rst clear thing to observe is that the mean and
median response for the Prize treatment are in line with those in previous
experiments. We can then safely conclude that despite being implemented
online, this treatment is comparable to lab experiments.
Mean Median Std dev Group size
Study 1 - Prize 36.1 33 23 110-170
Study 1 - No prize 39.2 37 23.3 103-156
Nagel (1995) 37.2 33 20 14-16
Ho et al. (1998) 38.9 NA 24.7 7
Camerer (2003) 32.5 NA 18.6 20-32
Kovalchik et al. (2005) 37 NA 17.5 33
Kocher and Sutter (2005) 34.9 32 NA 17
Buhren and Bjorn (2010) 32.1 29.6 22.2 6,112
Agranov et al. (2012) 36.4 33 21 8
Table 1: Aggregate results in Study 1 and in various beauty contest games.
Second, the No prize treatment shows the highest average and median
responses. If lower responses indicate deeper reasoning, the lack of mone-
tary prizes should induce subjects to think less about the game and hence
they should respond higher numbers than in the Prize treatment. Under
that assumption, the accumulated distribution of responses for the No prize
treatment should rst order stochastically dominate the accumulated distri-
bution of responses for the Prize treatment.12 Figure 2 corroborates this:
the cumulative distribution of responses of the No prize treatment is below
the one of the Prize treatment.
11Camerer (2003) uses CEOs; Kovalchik et al. (2005) 80 year olds; Buhren and Bjorn
(2010) employs chess players, from amateurs to Grand masters.
12Given two cumulative distributions F (x) and G(x), F rst order stochastically dom-
inates G if F (x)  G(x) for every x.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distributions of responses by treatment.
Result 1.1 The distribution of responses under Prize di¤ers from the dis-
tribution under No-prize (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:041; Median test,
p = 0:047).
A closer look at the data shows that males and females respond very
di¤erently to the presence of a monetary prize. Table 2 shows the aggregate
results for males and females in the two treatments. The striking result there
is that average and median responses for females in the No prize treatment
are much higher than any other. The other interesting observation is that
malesresponses do not seem to di¤er much across the two treatments.
Mean Median Std dev Obs.
Male & No-prize 37.6 35 23.9 243
Female & No-prize 41.9 42 23.3 148
Male & Prize 35.7 33 22.7 237
Female & Prize 36.4 34 23.5 164
Table 2: Aggregate results by gender and treatment.
Result 1.2 The distribution of responses of females di¤ers between Prize
and No-prize treatments (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:026; Median test,
p = 0:054), and di¤ers between males and females in the No prize
treatment (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:049; Median test, p = 0:029).
10
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
a
cc
u
m
lu
te
d
 fr
e
q
.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
R es pons e
Males  (n=480)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
ac
cu
m
lu
te
d
 fr
eq
.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
R es pons e
Female (n=312)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
a
cc
u
m
lu
te
d
 fr
e
q
.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
R es pons e
Pr iz e  trea tmen t (n=401)
Figure 3: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender and treatment.
Figure 3 breaks down the cumulative distributions of responses by gender
across treatments (upper panels) and by treatments across genders (lower
panels). The cumulative distribution of responses in the Prize treatment
is given by the solid line. The graphs show clearly that the distribution
of female responses under No prize rst order stochastically dominates the
distribution of female responses in the Prize treatment, whereas dominance
for males is unclear. In order to compare distributions of responses, we
employ the test of stochastic dominance introduced by Davidson and Duc-
los (2000).13 This tests allows us to associate stochastic dominance to a
particular range of responses and, hence, to a certain degree of strategic
sophistication. The Davidson and Duclos (2000) test yields that the distrib-
ution of female responses under the No prize treatment rst order stochas-
13This test compares distributions at pre-determined points. A distribution is said to
rst stochastically dominate another if for all comparison points for which di¤erences
between the two distributions are statistically signicant the sign of these di¤erence is
identical. In our analysis, we compare distributions at all possible responses.
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tically dominates the distribution under the Prize treatment. In addition,
the distribution of male responses is not statistically di¤erent across the two
treatments. Although a higher proportion of males respond numbers be-
tween 30 and 50 compared to the No prize treatment, the di¤erence is too
small to be signicant.
The lower left panel shows the cumulative distributions of male and fe-
male responses under the No prize treatment. The dominance test allows us
to conclude that the distribution of female responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of male responses in the No prize treatment. Fur-
thermore, dominance comes from the ranges marked by the vertical dashed
lines, the responses between 0 and 18 and between 35 and 54. According
to the k-level theory, these are the responses roughly corresponding to very
sophisticated and relatively unsophisticated subjects respectively. More fe-
males then seem to populate the medium sophistication range of responses
(between 19 and 34) and the quite unsophisticated range (55 and above),
although no gender di¤erences exist in the proportion of truly irrational re-
sponses (68 and above). The lower right panel shows a very di¤erent picture:
when a monetary prize is given, the only signicant di¤erences emerge for
responses 0 and 1. This di¤erence is due to a higher proportion of females
responding these numbers. Hence, according to Davidson and Duclos (2000)
criterion, dominance reverses, suggesting that in the presence of incentives
females are at least as sophisticated as males.
We conclude from Study 1 that females drastically change their responses
depending on the presence or not of nancial incentives. Females show
deeper levels of reasoning (as suggested by their lower responses) when a
monetary prize was given. On the other hand, males do not respond to the
monetary incentive and display a similar behavior in the two treatments.
This would suggest that the conclusion of Camerer and Hogarth (1999)
whereby monetary incentives have a small e¤ect in experimental games
might not necessarily apply to female populations. If nancial incentives
constitute a cue indicating that the beauty contest is a competitive game,
it is to be expected that females react to this contextual information more
strongly than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
Nevertheless, the fact that gender di¤erences disappear when a mone-
tary prize is awarded suggest that males consider that a non-monetary prize
is at stake in the No prize treatment. This non-monetary prize could be the
utility of winning. This factor has been already studied in auctions (Cox et
al., 1992). In contests, Sheremeta (2010) nds that about a third of sub-
jects are willing to spend a positive amount of money in order to win a zero
value prize. Furthermore, Sheremeta (2010) is able to elicit the valuation
12
of winning in his experiment in monetary terms. One might be tempted to
conclude that in our experiment, since males in the No prize treatment be-
have similarly to females in the Prize treatment (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:648),
malesvalue of winning would be roughly equivalent to £ 10. Note however
that we nd no evidence of males increasing their depth of reasoning (lower-
ing their responses) when a monetary prize is given. This might suggest that
for males 1) psychological and monetary rewards crowd out each other, so a
utility function incorporating both types of gains should not be additive; or
2) that rewards of any type have very strong decreasing returns. We choose
not to elaborate more on this since the correct specication of such utility
function is not the focus of our design.
Note that Study 1 does not allow us to check whether beliefs about the
sophistication of others di¤er between males and females. Nor whether they
respond di¤erently to gender priming. To that end, we present next the
result of a laboratory experiment using a within-subjects design.
4 Study 2: Beauty in the lab
The second study was conducted with undergraduate students at the Uni-
versity of Barcelona in May of 2012 and March of 2013. Subjects were
recruited in the standard way. We conducted two sessions of 48 participants
each. The gender composition of each group of participants was balanced,
so that half were female and the other half were male. The experiment was
implemented with pen and paper, no feedback was provided at any time.
Experimenters answered privately any questions that subjects had. Sessions
lasted between 40 and 50 minutes.
Each session had two phases. In the rst phase, there were neither
monetary incentives nor gender priming.14 We assigned students randomly
in two groups of equal size and with an even gender composition. Therefore,
there were two groups of 24 subjects (12 male and 12 female) with two
instructors (one female and one male) in each room. Each group occupied
a separate room. The two rooms were located in two di¤erent corridors.
During this phase, subjects were asked to guess a fraction p of the average
response in their room. They played nine rounds of this guessing game
with di¤erent values of p in each round, i.e. p =
 
1; 23 ;
11
10 ;
1
3 ;
3
2 ;
1
5 ;
6
5 ;
1
2 ;
4
3

.
Instructions were provided through white paper booklets where they also
had to record their answers. Subjects did not write neither their name or
their gender in these booklets. Each participants was assigned a number.
14For showing up, subjects received a voucher worth a refreshment in the campus café.
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The second phase of the session was composed by two rounds where
subjects had to guess the 23 of the average response in the room. In this
phase, monetary incentives and gender priming were introduced. The dif-
ference between the two rounds was the gender composition of the group.
In the rst round (the SG round), students were regrouped so that there
were two gender homogenous groups: one formed only by female subjects
and the other formed by male subjects only. We did this regrouping by
moving the male students in one room and the female students in the other
through di¤erent corridors so they could not see each other. They were
guided in this process by an instructor of their same gender who made all
e¤orts to avoid information transmission among participants. For the sec-
ond and last round (the MG round), subjects were mixed again by gender
following the same process. Subjects who moved were those who had stayed
in the previous round. During this second phase, gender priming was fur-
ther implemented by distributing pink paper booklets to female subjects and
blue paper booklets to male subjects. In addition, the gender of the pair
of instructors present in each room matched the gender composition of the
subjects in it. This means that when groups were gender balanced there was
one female and one male instructor in each room. And when groups were
of the same gender, the gender of the two instructors in the room coincided
with the gender of the group. The payo¤s of the session were determined
by selecting randomly one the two rounds of the second phase. We provided
two prizes of 40 euros (around 55$) each, one prize for the winner(s) in each
room (if the MG round was selected) or within each gender group (if the
SG round was selected). At the end of the session, students lled up a short
questionnaire aimed at measuring beliefs and potential stereotypes.
4.1 Results within rounds
4.1.1 First phase: no gender priming, no incentives
Table 3 depicts the aggregate results for the round with no priming and
no incentives with p = 23 (NPNI round henceforth). It shows that the
distribution of male responses has a lower mean and median than the one
of females.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 28.5 25 15.7
Females 34.1 30 21.3
Table 3: Aggregate results by gender in the NPNI round.
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By comparing the cumulative distributions of responses for male and
females we can state the rst result of Study 2, which is in line with the
results in the No-prize treatment of Study 1.
Result 2.1 In the NPNI round, the distribution of female responses rst
order stochastically dominates the distribution of male responses.
Figure 4 illustrates this result. Females show a lower level of sophis-
tication than males in the absence of incentives and gender priming. The
Davidson and Duclos (2000) test allows us to establish that this gender dif-
ference emerges in the interval of responses from 42 to 56 which corresponds
to a low level of strategic sophistication. This dominance result holds in all
the other rounds of the rst phase.15
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Figure 4: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender in NPNI round.
Next, we assess the sophistication of subjects by considering their re-
sponses in the rounds of the rst phase (no incentives and no gender priming)
with p 6= 1: For each p, we assign level k = f1; 2; 3;1g of sophistication to
each individual response xi when k minimizes d =
 
xi   50pk
2
. We follow
Coricelli and Nagel (2009) to classify responses as low level if k = 1 (high
otherwise). A subject is considered of low (high) sophistication if at least 5
out of 8 responses are of low (high) level. The rest of subjects are considered
random and discarded from the analysis. This classication does not only
15The distribution of females responses rst order stochastically dominates the one of
males for all rounds with p < 1 and the reverse holds in all rounds with p > 1:
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reect how close an individual plays with respect to the equilibrium predic-
tion. It also indirectly incorporates beliefs about the sophistication of the
opponent: Coricelli and Nagel (2009) show through fMRI that, compared to
a treatment in which subjects play against computers, subjects classied as
highly sophisticated display activation in areas of the brain associated with
theory of mind. On the contrary, low sophistication subjects do not display
additional activity. Nevertheless, we consider an alternative classication in
Section 5. All our results still go through.
As Table 4 shows, 77 % of the classied individuals in the sample are
classied as low sophisticated; from these, 67% are female. The percentages
of High and Low subjects out of the whole pool (70.8% and 20.8% respec-
tively) are very similar to the ones obtained in previous studies.16 However,
these gures mask important gender di¤erences. The small fraction of fe-
males who exhibit high strategic sophistication stands out. Statistical tests
conrm that the distribution of levels of sophistication di¤ers across genders
(2 = 8:39; p = 0:003; Fishers exact p = 0:005).
Low High Total
Males 26 15 41
Females 42 5 47
Total 68 20 88
Table 4: Sophistication by gender (rst phase).
A word of caution is in order here: This classication employs choices
under no incentives. Hence, it is likely that the number of subjects that
we classify as low sophisticated is an upper bound. From Study 1 we know
that females display higher strategic sophistication when a monetary prize
is awarded. That could account for the low number of highly sophisticated
females. However, as we will see below, this classication has considerable
predictive power in the remaining rounds of the study.
4.1.2 Second phase: incentives, gender priming
Now we move to the second phase of the experimental session where we
introduce gender priming and incentives. As mentioned above, the second
phase had in two rounds. In the SG round, participants were separated
in two rooms in such a way that they were competing against individuals
16Coricelli and Nagel (2009) obtain 50% and 35% respectively (n=20). Brañas-Garza,
Garc¬a-Muñoz and Hernan (2012) obtain percentages of 78% and 13% (n=191).
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of their same gender. In the MG round, we regrouped them again so the
gender composition in each room was balanced. In both rounds, pecuniary
incentives came into play. One of the rounds was randomly chosen at the
end of the session to determine payo¤s.
The MG round In this round, half of the participants were male and half
were female in each room. Table 5 shows that the distribution of responses
of females has a lower mean and median than the one of males.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 27.1 25 18.1
Females 20.7 15 18.2
Table 5: Aggregate results by gender in the MG round.
Females appear to display higher strategic sophistication than males in
this round. The comparison of the distributions of responses across genders
in the MG round shows indeed that they are statistically di¤erent (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0:036; Median test, p = 0:014). Furthermore, the dominance
test provides a clear ordering between them.
Result 2.2 The distribution of male responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of female responses in the MG round.
Figure 5 illustrates this result. The dominance test establishes that there
is a higher number of females than males who chose responses in the interval
between 12 and 29 (marked by the vertical dashed lines). This suggests that
more females display relatively high levels of sophistication.
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Figure 5: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender, MG round.
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A closer look to the data reveals that the participants who are responsible
for this result are those classied as low sophisticated in the rst phase. The
distributions of responses di¤er across genders for low sophisticated subjects
only (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:005; Median test, p = 0:002). The dominance
result that we found for the whole sample is stronger and applies to a larger
interval of responses for low sophisticated individuals (left panel of Figure
6 below). Dominance is not statistically signicant for highly sophisticated
individuals (right panel of Figure 6 below).
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Figure 6: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender and
sophistication in the MG round.
Result 2.3 The distribution of male responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of female responses only for low sophis-
ticated individuals in the MG round.
The SG round In the SG round, participants played against their same
gender opponents. Table 6 shows the mean and median responses for males
and females in this round. The rst noticeable result again is that the
average male response is higher than the average female response.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 31.1 29 21.2
Females 20.1 17 13.5
Table 6: Aggregate results by gender in the SG round.
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The distributions of responses across genders are statistically di¤erent
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0:012; Median test, p = 0:014) and the dominance
result is even stronger than in the MG round as Figure 7 illustrates. The
interval of signicant dominance ranges from 13 to 67.
Result 2.4 The distribution of male responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of female responses in the SG round.
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Figure 7: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender in the SG round.
Again, if we split participants by their level of sophistication we observe
that gender di¤erences in responses only remain signicant for low sophis-
ticated individuals (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:002; Median test, p = 0:002).
There are no gender di¤erences among high sophisticated individuals. The
dominance of the distribution of male responses becomes stronger when we
only look at low sophisticated participants, as Figure 8 below illustrates.
Result 2.5 The distribution of male responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of female responses only for low sophis-
ticated individuals in the SG round.
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Figure 8: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender and
sophistication in the SG round.
To summarize, the main ndings of the analysis per round are:
1. Results for the NPNI round conrm that males show higher levels of
sophistication than females in the absence of incentives and gender
priming. This is in line with Study 1.
2. This result reverses when gender priming and incentives are intro-
duced: Females show higher levels of sophistication than males.
3. The gender di¤erences in the SG and MG rounds are due to low so-
phisticated individuals. There are no gender di¤erences among high
sophisticated individuals.
4.2 Results across rounds
Let us now exploit our within-subject design and compare individual re-
sponses rst across the NPNI and the MG rounds, and second, across the
MG and the SG rounds. The latter comparison involves a change in the
gender composition of groups. This was designed to trigger beliefs and
stereotypes about the relative strategic sophistication of males and females.
This intervention also allows us to explore the presence of stereotype threat.
The stereotype threat literature suggests that members of the threatened
group su¤er negative feelings and thoughts which in turn worsen their per-
formance. We then expect the responses of members of the threatened group
(if any) to shift up when playing in mixed gender groups compared to when
they play in same gender groups. This might be the case for female if they
perceive that the calculation involved in the guessing game favors males.
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4.2.1 Comparison of the NPNI and the MG rounds
Table 7 below compares responses across the NPNI and the MG rounds and
across genders. We observe that females change their behavior considerably.
Their mean and median responses are much lower in the mixed gender round.
However, men barely change their answers across rounds.
Mean Median Std dev
Male, NPNI 28.5 25 15.7
Female, NPNI 34.1 30 21.3
Male, MG 27.1 25 18.1
Female, MG 20.7 15 18.2
Table 7: Aggregate results by gender across NPNI and MG rounds.
Result 2.6 The distributions of responses in the NPNI and MG rounds
di¤er for females (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p < 0:001; Sign-test p < 0:001).
The Q-Q plot in Figure 9 illustrates this result. Male quantiles are
distributed around the 45 degree line while female quantiles are above this
line. This indicates that the distribution of female responses shifts down
when there is gender priming and incentives, whereas the distribution for
males does not shift in any clear direction between rounds.
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Figure 9: Q-Q plots by gender comparing NPNI and MG rounds.
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This corroborates our results in Study 1. Females change their behavior
when incentives are introduced whereas males behave similarly with and
without incentives. Note that the di¤erence in play between these two
rounds cannot be accounted for merely by the decrease in responses that
takes place in repeated guessing games with no feedback (Weber, 2003). In
contrast with Study 1 gender di¤erences do not disappear when incentives
are introduced. This suggests that the additional strategic sophistication
that females display in the MG round is due to gender priming. Alterna-
tively, it might be that the bigger size of the prize compared to the one in
Study 1 (40 vs 12 euros) is inducing females to think more deeply about the
game. However, that would imply that males are extremely insensitive to
the size of monetary incentives.
Further analyses show that low sophisticated females are the ones low-
ering their responses (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p < 0:001; Sign-test p < 0:001)
whereas highly sophisticated females do not change their responses signi-
cantly. However, due to the small fraction of highly sophisticated females
this result is inconclusive. We come back to this in section 6.2 where we use
an alternative measure of strategic sophistication.
4.2.2 Comparison of the SG and the MG rounds
Let us now compare the SG and the MG rounds. Recall that in the second
phase of the session we manipulated the gender composition of the group
of participants. The purpose of this manipulation was to explore the role
of beliefs about the sophistication of others. We expect gender priming to
make individual beliefs about the relative sophistication of males and females
salient. If this is the case, responses should change with the gender composi-
tion of the group. In the following analysis, we assume that if an individual
believes that a change in the gender composition shifts up the distribuion
of levels of sophistication in the group, his/her choice would decrease17. On
the other hand, if stereotype threat is relevant in the beauty contest, the
change in the gender composition of the group of opponents should arouse
anxiety and negative thoughts in the threatened group. If these negative
feelings impair the mentalizing process, the threatened group should display
lower levels of sophistication when playing in mixed gender groups. In that
case, we expect the distribution of responses of the threatened group to shift
down when playing against the other group.
17Agranov et al (2012) make a similar assumption when they make undergraduate stu-
dents play against graduate students.
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Table 8 shows that the average and median responses of females do not
signicantly di¤er between the SG and the MG rounds. On the other hand,
male responses appear to be higher when males play against males compared
to when they play in mixed gender groups.
Mean Median Std dev
Male, SG 31.1 29 21.2
Female, SG 20.1 17 13.5
Male, MG 27.1 25 18.1
Female, MG 20.7 15 18.2
Table 8: Aggregate results by gender across SG and MG.
To have a more clear picture, we provide in Figure 10 the Q-Q plot of
male responses to both rounds, SG and MG. It is evident that distribution of
male responses shifts down when they play in mixed gender groups compared
to when they play only against males.
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Figure 10: Q-Q plot for males comparing MG and SG rounds.
Result 2.7 The distributions of responses in the SG and the MG rounds
di¤er for males (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p = 0:083; Sign-test p = 0:099).
Changes in gender composition seem to a¤ect only males. When playing
in mixed gender groups, they show more strategic sophistication than when
they play only against males. Females do not alter their behavior so there
is no evidence of stereotype threat among them. If anything, stereotypes
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might be a¤ecting males. However, the actual mechanism is unclear at
this point. Males might be enjoying a "stereotype lift" (Walton and Cohen,
2003), because they think that females are less sophisticated. That enhanced
sense of self-e¢ cacy would lead them to think more about the game when
playing in mixed gender groups. Alternatively, males could be experiencing
"stereotype arousal" (OBrien and Crandall, 2003), and react to stereotype
threat by making additional mentalizing e¤ort. Finally, males might be
lowering their responses simply because they believe females respond lower
numbers. Next, we explore this and related issues by analyzing the responses
to the questionnaire that we administered at the end of the session.
Before that, let us summarize the results of the analysis across rounds:
1. Results conrm that females react strongly to the presence of incen-
tives whereas males do not.
2. Males react to the gender composition of the group. Males display
higher strategic sophistication when playing in mixed gender groups
compared to when they play only against males.
5 Beliefs and stereotypes
In this section, we explore whether (ex-post) stated beliefs correlate with be-
havior. This is relevant for two reasons: On the one hand, strategic sophis-
tication is endogenous to the perceived sophistication of others (Georganas
et al, 2010; Agranov et al, 2012; Alaoui and Penta, 2013). On the other
hand, if subjects have gender stereotypes, these could a¤ect their choices.
Next, we analyze responses to the questions in the personal question-
naire that subjects had to ll at the end of the session and before winners
were announced. The objective of these questions was to capture beliefs or
gender stereotypes which could a¤ect answers in the game. Although these
ex-post beliefs were not elicited via a scoring rule, they still may o¤er a
complementary view on observed behavior.
We focus mostly on the responses to two questions. First, "Which gender
responds higher numbers? (when p = 23)" (Q1), and second, "Which gender
is better at this game?" (Q2).18 These questions try to capture di¤erent fac-
tors which might be important to understand the behavior of participants.
18The rest of questions were "Do males/females compete better in single/mixed gender
groups?" and " Did you change your response when there was a monetary prize/the
composition of the group changed?".
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Q1 is designed to obtain information on beliefs about the behavior of oth-
ers. Q2 is designed to detect stereotype threat and beliefs about the relative
strategic sophistication of males and females. The responses to these two
questions were signicantly correlated (Spearman  =  0:369; p < 0:001):
This implies that participants understand the basics of the game and asso-
ciate a better performance with lower responses.
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Figure 11: Responses by gender to Q1 and Q2 (females/pink, males/blue).
The left panel of Figure 11 shows the histogram of responses to Q1. The
majority of females in the sample think that males respond higher numbers,
while malesresponses to this question are more balanced. This di¤erence
in responses is statistically signicant (2 = 7:32 p = 0:026; Fishers exact
p = 0:028). The right panel of Figure 11 shows that females have more
polarized views than males on which gender is better at the game. Both
females and males, show a higher proportion of answers in favour of their
own gender. But this e¤ect is stronger for females. However, the are no
statistically signicant gender di¤erences in the responses to this question.
Next, let us explore whether there exist di¤erences in the responses to
these questions by level of sophistication. The left panel of Figure 12 shows
that there are clear di¤erences between low and high sophisticated subjects
in the response to Q1. These di¤erences are statistically signicant (2 =
12:66 p = 0:002; Fishers exact p = 0:002). Low sophisticated subjects
believe that men tend to respond higher numbers than females. Highly
sophisticated subjects have the opposite beliefs. Responses to Q2 show a
less clear-cut pattern. The majority of high sophisticated subjects think that
males are better at the game. Low sophisticated individuals do not hold the
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opposite belief. They have more polarized views. Still, the distributions
of responses are statistically di¤erent between the two sophistication levels
(2 = 9:95 p = 0:041; Fishers exact p = 0:042).
Recall that the high sophisticated group is mainly populated by male
subjects. Hence, their responses to Q1 and Q2 may not be that surpris-
ing. The gender composition of the low sophisticated group is more diverse.
However, males and females in this group seem to share the belief that males
chose higher numbers.
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Figure 12: Responses by sophistication level to Q1 and Q2.
Given these di¤erences in responses across genders and sophistication
levels, the next question is whether they can explain di¤erences in behavior.
The left panel of Figure 13 compares the distribution of responses in the SG
and MG rounds for subjects who state that individuals of the same gender
respond higher numbers in the beauty contest. It shows that these subjects
lowered their responses in the MG round compared to the SG round. The
right panel performs the same comparison for the rest of subjects. They
tend to increase their answers in the MG round.
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Figure 13: Q-Q plot across SG and MG rounds by responses to Q1.
Result 3.1 The median responses of subjects who think their same (the
other) gender respond higher numbers is higher (lower) in the SG
round than in the MG round (Sign-test p = 0:002 and p = 0:044
respectively).
This result is relevant since it shows that ex-post stated beliefs are con-
sistent with behavior.19 The di¤erence between rounds is not surprising for
males since we already found that males change their behavior according to
the gender composition of the group (Result 2.7). Females, on the contrary,
did not show signicant di¤erences in behavior between the MG and the SG
round. Hence, Result 3.1 does not t well with that nding.
An explanation to this can be obtained by analyzing the behavior of
females who believe that females respond higher numbers. They do change
their behavior across the SG and the MG rounds (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p =
0:031; Sign-test p = 0:070). Thus, Q1 allows us to qualify our previous result
stating that females do not respond to the gender composition of the group.
This begs the question of whether these females are di¤erent from the rest
in any dimension. A careful look to the data reveals no di¤erences in any
of the other characteristics we have information about. Thus, we can only
conclude that females who react to the gender composition of the group act
purely because of their beliefs about the responses of other females.
19Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) nd that behavior is not consistent with stated
beliefs in half of the normal-form games they study. Rey-Biel (2009) obtains a somewhat
higher proportion of consistent choices in constant-sum games. Because we do not elicit
beliefs in an incentive compatible manner, we cannot contribute to this debate.
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Regarding males, recall that we closed Section 4 with an open question.
We had observed that the distribution of responses of males in the MG
round shifted down compared to the SG round. We stated three candidate
explanations there: 1) males experienced stereotype lift; 2) males exerted
extra e¤ort in order to compensate their stereotype threat; and 3) they
responded lower numbers just because they expected females to do so. The
analysis of Q1 and Q2 can help us to shed light on this. Under explanation
1) males who changed behavior should be those who think that males are
better at the game. The opposite would occur under explanation 2). Finally,
we should be able to check explanation 3) in the responses to Q1.
As expected from Result 3.1, males who think that men respond higher
numbers than females change their behavior between the SG and the MG
rounds (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p = 0:022; Sign-test p = 0:032). The same
result applies for males who think that females are better at the game.
(Wilcoxon sign-rank, p = 0:053; Sign-test p = 0:054). This would seem
to discard explanation 1) because is not the case that males who display
higher sophistication in the MG round believe females play worse in the
game. These results thus give support to explanations 2) and 3). However,
the signicant correlation between the answers to Q1 and Q2 and the fact
that the p-values are lower when using Q1 seem to suggest that maleschange
in behavior is due mostly to beliefs about female behavior.
The responses to the question "Do females compete better in single/mixed
gender groups?" (Q3) provide a di¤erent view. Responses to this question
are not signicantly correlated to responses in Q1 and Q2. But as it turns
out, males who change their behavior between the SG and the MG rounds
are the ones who believe that females compete better in mixed gender groups
(Wilcoxon sign-rank, p = 0:030; Sign-test p = 0:032). This together with
their answer to Q2 suggest that males who display more sophistication in
the MG round might be thinking more deeply about the game because they
experience stereotype arousal.
6 Robustness checks
A key instrument in the analysis so far has been the denition of sophisti-
cation. The classication we followed, based on Coricelli and Nagel (2009),
presents two main limitations. On the one hand, this classication is coarse.
On the other hand, it does not take explicitly into account beliefs about
the sophistication of others. In order to address both issues, we modify our
denition of sophistication in two ways.
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Firstly, we expand the classication of strategic sophistication by con-
sidering three levels (low, medium and high) instead of two. Secondly, we
measure strategic sophistication as the quadratic distance to the winning
response. We refer to this measure as accuracy. It has the advantage of
accounting for depth of reasoning and correctness of beliefs on othersre-
sponses simultaneously.
6.1 Robustness check (I): A ner classication
Under the classication of Coricelli and Nagel (2009), many of the subjects in
our sample are classied as low sophisticated. Recall that low sophisticated
individuals are dened as those with a majority of L0 and L1 responses. In
order to rene this classication, we expand the set of types and consider
L0 as low sophisticated and L1 responses as medium sophisticated. We then
classify subjects according to the mode sophistication of their responses in
the rst phase. In cases were there is more than one mode, the subject
remains unclassied and is excluded from the analysis. Hence, subjects who
were classied before as highly sophisticated remain in this category.20
Low Medium High Total
Males 8 14 17 39
Females 18 15 6 39
Total 26 29 23 78
Table 9: Sophistication by gender under alternative classication.
Table 9 shows sophistication levels by gender under this classication.
Sophistication levels are not equally distributed across genders (2 = 9:14
p = 0:01; Fishers exact p = 0:012). Still the number of low sophisticated
females is larger than of males. The opposite holds for high sophisticated
individuals. Recall that this classication employs the answers to the rounds
where there were no priming and no gender incentives.
All our previous results by level of sophistication hold under this new
classication. Moreover, this ner classication allows us to further explore
the behavior of medium and low sophisticated subjects. This yields an
additional nding.
Result 4.1 The distributions of responses in the SG and MG rounds di¤er
for medium sophisticated males (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p = 0:020; Sign-
20One more female is classied as high sophisticated than under the previous classica-
tion. This is because she was classied as random before.
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test p = 0:022) and highly sophisticated females (Wilcoxon sign-rank,
p = 0:052; Sign-test p = 0:062).
Result 4.1 is illustrated in Figure 14. The distribution of responses
of medium sophisticated males and high sophisticated females shifts down
when playing in mixed gender groups. We see this result to be in line with
the ndings in Alaoui and Penta (2013). They nd that subjects who react
to changes in the perceived sophistication of the opponent are those capable
of at least one level of depth of reasoning. Similarly, we nd that males who
react to the gender composition of the group of opponents are sophisticated
enough to entertain beliefs about the sophistication of others. High sophisti-
cated males, on the other hand, might not be reacting to gender composition
because they follow equilibrium play more closely. This is substantiated by
the fact that the great majority of males classied as high sophisticated
believe that females respond higher numbers (see left panel of Figure 12).
Despite that, they do not alter their behavior signicantly when the gender
composition of the group changes.
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Figure 14: Q-Q plot comparing MG and SG rounds ( p = 23).
6.2 Robustness check (II): Accuracy
As a second robustness check, we use an alternative measure of sophistication
that we refer to as accuracy. We measure the quadratic distance to the
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winning response in each round and take the average. This measure of
sophistication is similar to strategic IQ in Coricelli and Nagel (2009). This
measure accounts for depth of reasoning and for the correctness of beliefs on
othersresponses directly. We also compute the quadratic distance (inverse
of accuracy) for the SG and MG rounds.
The distributions of average accuracies for females and males are di¤erent
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0:001; Median test, p = 0:002). As Figure 15 shows,
female players appear to be less accurate than male players. Notice though,
that this average measure of accuracy corresponds to the rounds with no
priming and no incentives. Average distance to the winning response is
clearly higher for low sophisticated individuals. In a nutshell, there is a close
relationship between our previous measure of sophistication and accuracy.
Average accuracy by gender and sophistication
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Figure 15: Average accuracy by gender and sophistication.
The distributions of accuracies for males and females also di¤er in the
SG and MG rounds (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:032 and p = 0:009 respectively).
Figure 16 shows that females display more sophistication (lower quadratic
distance) than males when gender is primed. Moreover, gender di¤erences in
accuracy in this two rounds are not statistically signicant for those subjects
with above average accuracy in the rst phase (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:465 in
SG, p = 0:199 in MG). All these results are in line with those in section
4.1.2.
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Figure 16: Average accuracy by gender and sophistication.
Recall that we observed that females thought more deeply about the
game when we introduced incentives. On the other hand, males reacted to
the composition of the group by showing more sophistication in the MG
roundthan in the SG round. We revisit these results using our measure of
accuracy.
Result 4.2 The distributions of accuracies across the NPNI and MG rounds
do not di¤er for females in the top 30th percentile (Wilcoxon sign-rank,
p = 0:266) but di¤er for the rest (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p < 0:001). The
distributions do not di¤er across the SG and MG rounds.
The left panel of Figure 17 illustrates this result. The distribution of
female accuracy shifts up when we introduced incentives. When we restrict
attention to the top 30th percentile (n = 16) we nd that these females
did not react to incentives. This conrms the preliminary results that we
obtained in section 4.2.1.
The right panel illustrates the increase in accuracy of males when they
play against females. The shift, however, is not enough to be statistically
signicant. This shows that there is not a one to one correspondence be-
tween accuracy and sophistication dened as closeness to equilibrium play.
Males show more sophistication but not more accuracy when they play in
mixed gender groups compared to when they play only against males. They
adjusted their responses to the fact that female respond lower numbers but
not enough to become more accurate.
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Figure 17: Q-Q plot of accuracy by gender comparing rounds.
Finally, we explore the relationship between average accuracy and beliefs.
Figure 18 shows that males who believe that females respond higher numbers
are more accurate (have a lower average distance to the winning response)
than the rest of subjects. In addition, males who think that females are
better in the game are much less accurate than the rest of males.
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Figure 18: Average accuracy and stereotypes by responses to Q1 and Q2.
7 Discussion and conclusions
There is substantial experimental evidence of individual heterogeneity in
depth of strategic reasoning. An individuals observed strategic sophisti-
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cation depends on her mentalizing abilities, but also on her beliefs about
the sophistication of others and on the size of monetary incentives. Gender
might be relevant to all these three factors.
In this paper, we explored the existence and endogeneity of gender dif-
ferences in observed strategic sophistication. We used the beauty contest
game as experimental device. We chose this game because it is competitive,
because incentives and gender stereotypes can be easily manipulated and
because it involves a relatively complex calculation task.
We reported results from two studies. Study 1 was a large between-
subject experiment. The main result of this study is that gender di¤erences
in behavior appear only when no monetary prize was awarded. We interpret
this result in line with Croson and Gneezy (2009): The presence of mone-
tary incentives frames the interaction as competitive. Females, being more
sensitive to contextual information, think more deeply about the game. An
alternative, but not incompatible, explanation might be that males derive
utility from winning regardless of whether a monteray ptize is at stake.
Study 2 was a within-subject experiment. In this study, we manipulated
incentives and gender priming. The main results of this study were two:
In line with Study 1, females display higher sophistication when incentives
are introduced and gender is primed. However, gender di¤erences do not
disappear as in Study 1; they actually reverse. Females appear to be more
sophisticated than males. This di¤erential e¤ect is due to gender priming.
The second result emerges out of the manipulation of the gender compo-
sition of the group. We observed that only males modied their responses
then. Males displayed higher depth of reasoning when playing in mixed
gender groups than when playing only against males. We thus nd no ev-
idence of stereotype threat a¤ecting females. Responses to a questionnaire
that participants lled at the end of each session suggest that males react to
gender composition because they think females are better in the game. We
conjecture that males are reacting to stereotype arousal by engaging further
in the mentalizing process.
As a robustness check, we modied the denition of sophistication in
two ways. First, we expanded the classication in levels of sophistication.
We observed that medium sophisticated males are the ones reacting to the
gender composition of the group. Highly sophisticated males do not change
their responses despite the majority of them believe that females respond
higher numbers. This suggests that beliefs about the sophistication of others
a¤ect choices only when the individual is su¢ ciently sophisticated but not so
much to adhere to equilibrium play as a rule. Second, we measured strategic
sophistication as the quadratic distance to the winning response. We found
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that the most accurate females did not respond to our manipulation of
incentives nor to gender priming.
Our results conrm previous ndings in the experimental literature point-
ing out the importance of beliefs about the strategic sophistication of other
players (e. g. Agranov et al, 2012). We also highlight the endogeneity
of depth of reasoning with respect to incentives (also found in Alaoui and
Penta, 2013). Regarding gender, our results show that the combination of
incentives and gender priming enhances femalesperformance. This suggests
that the gender di¤erences observed in competitiveness in real-e¤ort tasks
may not translate to strategic settings. We nd that when gender is made
salient, females appear to be more sophisticated than males; males are aware
of this and that they adjust their behavior accordingly.
Indirect evidence (e.g. Burnham et al, 2009) seemed to suggest that no
gender di¤erences exist in the beauty contest. We observe di¤erences only
when we manipulated incentives and gender priming. This might explain
why there are so few studies reporting gender di¤erences (or the lack of)
in strategic interactions. In incentivized experiments, gender di¤erences
might arise only if gender is made salient. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2013) nd
that mentioning gender is enough to modify performance in a competition.
Nevertheless, we are aware that subjectscharacteristics could correlate with
gender, e. g. major of study in undergraduate populations, and thus create
spurious gender di¤erences.21 Our subject pool in Study 2 was relatively
homogeneous. Our participants were students of Economics or Business, of
very similar age and ethnic and cultural background, so we are relatively
free from this problem.
Our nal remark refers to the portability of our results. The beauty
contest is a relatively complex game with a big strategy space. Hence, it
is to be expected that players use simpler rules of play. These rules might
be di¤erent across games. Georganas et al (2010) nd that the level of
sophistication of subjects is similar across games of the same family but
varies across families of games. By denition, simple rules of play are more
sensitive to individual characteristics than equilibrium play. In fact, level-k
theories can indeed be interpreted as models of rules of thumb grounded
on "an instinctive reaction to the game" (Crawford et al, 2013). An open
question is whether the gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication that we
uncover in the beauty contest remain in games where standard equilibrium
predictions are more transparent and where subjects may resort to rules of
thumb to a lesser extent. We plan to tackle this in our future research.
21We thank Colin Camerer for pointing this out.
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Appendix: Instructions (translated from Spanish)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Hello. Many thanks for taking part in this session.
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in
strategic settings.
The session is organized in two parts:
In the rst part, you should answer a series of independent questions with
the objective of becoming familiar with the rules of the experiment.
In the second part, you should answer another series of independent
questions. You will compete with the rest of participants in your room for
a monetary prize. The participant with the most correct answer will be the
winner.
After reading these instructions you will nd the rst set of questions. We
will read each question aloud. You will have time to answer each question
before moving to the next one.
Read carefully each question and take the time you need to answer it.
It is very important that you remain silent during the whole session.
Otherwise, the data collected will be useless.
Please do not go to the next question until we tell you to.
Before starting the experiment please write in the box below your
participant number.
GENERIC ROUND QUESTION (PHASE 1)
Each one of you should choose a number between 0 and 100 with the
objective of guessing (p fraction of) the average of the numbers chosen by
all the participants in this room.
The winner will be the participant(s) whose answer is the closest to the (p
fraction of the) average of all numbers chosen.
Which number do you choose?
Do not go to the next question until being instructed to do so.
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INSTRUCTIONS PHASE 2
Now the second phase of the experiment begins.
In this phase, you will participate in tow independent rounds. The
structure and rules are similar to those of phase 1 but there are two main
di¤erences:
1. The identity of the participants you will compete with will change in
each round.
2. There will be two monetary prizes of 40 euros each.
At the end of the second phase, one of the two rounds will be chosen
randomly. The winner of this round will obtain the prize. If there is more
than one winner in the chosen round, the prize will be split among the
winners.
Again questions will be read aloud.
Read carefully each question and take the time you need to answer it.
Recall that it is very important that you remain silent during the whole
session. Otherwise, the data collected will be useless.
Please do not go to the next question until we tell you to.
Before continuing please write in the box below your participant number.
GENERIC ROUND QUESTION (PHASE 2)
Each one of you should choose a number between 0 and 100 with the
objective of guessing the "2/3 of the average" of the numbers chosen in
this question by all the participants in this room.
The winner will be the participant(s) whose answer is the closest to the
2/3 of the average of all numbers chosen in this question by all the
participants in this room.
Which number do you choose?
Now close the booklet and remain silent.
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